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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Luis Guzman disagrees with Appellant Piercy's Statement of the Case to the extent
explained below.
On the night of April 20, 2005, Plaintiff Luis Guzman was one of the two passengers in a
car driven by Defendant Jennifer Sutton which struck a bull on Wamstad Road, just south of
Parma, Idaho. The animal was owned by Defendant Dale Piercy. Guzman was injured in the
crash and sued the defendants.
There is no dispute that the bull was owned by Piercy, that the bull escaped from Piercy's
pasture, and that Piercy' s pasture was within the boundaries of a herd district formed by the
Canyon County Commissioners in 1982.
During a long and convoluted litigation process, Piercy has challenged the validity of the
Herd District. Eventually Judge Petrie held a bifurcated bench trial, also referred to as a "minitrial", on October 8, 2008. On January 21, 2009, Judge Petrie issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in which he held that the 1982 Canyon County herd district
was invalid and void. R. Vol.6, p.1143-1144; R. Vol.6, p.965. Judge Petrie then retired.
Thereafter, the Idaho Legislature passed a new version of I.C. 31-857, effective July 1,
2009, to provide that the validity of a herd district may not be attacked after 7 years from its
formation.

Based upon this legislative amendment, Guzman asked the District Court (and new

Judge Ford) to reverse Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 Findings that the 1982 herd district is
invalid, and to dismiss Piercy' s 8th Defense claiming he is entitled to open range immunity,
arguing the amended stature was specifically made retroactive by its express language. R.Vol.6,
p.1154.
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In a written Order filed October 5, 2011, Judge Ford memorialized his Oral Ruling made
on Dec 9, 2010, vacating and reversing Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Bifurcated Portion of Trial on the basis that Dale Piercy' s
September 11,2008 amended Action for Declaratory Relief was time barred by Idaho Code
Section 31-857 and/or in the alternative by Idaho Code Section 5-224; ruling that Canyon
County's herd district ordinance is valid having been in effect for nearly 29 years, and Piercy's
declaratory action challenging it's validity was not filed within 7 years or 4 years of its
enactment. R. Vol.8, p.1393 at p.1417.
Guzman also joins in and adopts Sutton's Statement of the Case.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Cross Appellants Guzman and Sutton have appealed the issues of whether the
District Court erred in denying the Cross-Appellants' Motion to Reconsider and Reverse the
Court's Order Denying Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon
County, and Holding All Other Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is
Resolved, Entered On Or About October 9, 2007, based on estoppel by laches, quasi-estoppel,
and equitable estoppel.

ID. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court uses the same
standard employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Regl.
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). Summary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P. 56(c). ''The burden is on the moving party to prove an
absence of genuine issues of material fact" Rees v. State, Dep't of Health and Welfare, 143
Idaho 10, 14, 137 P.3d 397, 401 (2006). This Court views the facts and inferences in the record
in favor of the non-moving party. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168
(1997).
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law as to which there is free review on
appeal. Climax,LLC v Snake River Oncology of Eastern Idaho, 149 Idaho 791, 241 P.3d
964(2010).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.
Judge Petrie Did Not Abuse Discretion By Ruling that Guzman and Sutton Did Not
Waive Their Right To Assert The Statute Of Limitations Defense When They Entered The
Stipulation To Realign The Parties
Judge Petrie required a declaratory action and bifurcated trial as a procedure for
determining the validity of the 1982 herd district. Judge Petrie concluded that Canyon County
was a necessary party. Although Sutton was originally directed to bring the action against
Canyon County, the parties subsequently stipulated to realign themselves to properly and
logically address the issues presented by that action. This was accomplished pursuant to the
Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling filed September 4, 2008, R.Vol.4, p. 662-670,
by which Piercy was named Plaintiff in the amended declaratory action against Canyon County.
The trial court so found in its Written Order of October 5, 2011. R. Vol.8, p.1393 at p.1403.
By including a provision that read: "That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton
waive any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy' s Amended
3

Action for Declaratory Relief," Guzman never intentionally or knowingly waived his
affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations. The purpose of that language was to
create a record to permit the filing of an amended action for declaratory relief late in the case and
to avoid the time limitations found in IRCP 15(a) governing amendments to pleadings. This is
evident from the language used, i.e. that Guzman and Sutton waive any defenses "regarding the
timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief." Furthermore both
Guzman and Sutton asserted the statute of limitations defense before Judge Petrie' s ruling on the
validity of the 1982 Herd District (which his order did not address), R. Vol.8, p.1393 at p.1404,
and afterwards, R. Vol.8, p. 1393.
Judge Ford specifically determined that Sutton and Guzman "did not waive their right to
assert the statute of limitations defense when they entered the stipulation to realign the parties. If
the litigants intended that the stipulation include a specific waiver by (them) of their right to
assert a statute of limitations defense, the stipulation should have specifically stated that (they)
waive all statute of limitations defenses". R. Vol.8, p.1393 at p.1404
This is a discretionary ruling by the trial court which should not be overturned.

B.

Judge Ford Correctly Ruled That IC 31-857 Applies Retroactively
There is no dispute that the Canyon County Commissioners created a herd district in

1982; that the 1982 herd district encompassed Piercy's pasture; that Piercy's bull escaped from
said pasture; that Piercy' s bull was on W amstad Road at night just south of the Boise River,
within a herd district created in 1908 when the bull was struck by Sutton's car; and that Guzman
was injured as a result of that car/livestock collision. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment in Bifurcated Trial, January 21, 2008. R. Vol. 6, pp. 959-971; See also Exhibits J and
K to Walton Affidavit. R. Vol. 7, pp. 1241-1242; R. Vol. 7, p. 11243.
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In 2009, after the Court's January 21, 2008 Judgment in this matter, the Idaho Legislature

amended I.C. 31-857 to provide that, "No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps
preceding" the passing of a herd district ordinance, " ... shall be heard or considered after seven
(7) years has elapsed from the date of the order." l.C. 31-857.

Moreover, the statute was expressly declared to be retroactive by the Idaho Legislature.
The statute provides in toto:
31-857.SCHOOL, ROAD, HERD AND OTHER DISTRICTS
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF CREATION OR DISSOLUTION.
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district
has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established,
disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county
commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal prima facie
presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of two (2) years from the
date of such order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the
making of such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant
said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon the
party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of said order to show that
any of such preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or
regularly taken; and such prima facie presumption shall be a rule of evidence in
all courts in the state of Idaho. No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional
steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years
has lapsed from the date of the order. (emphasis added).
The statute expressly states that the statute applies to herd districts created before July 1,
2009, by its use of the language "Whenever any herd district. .. has heretofore been declared to be
created, established... ". Thus, by its express language, the statute applies retroactively to this
herd district, and to all herd districts created prior to July 1, 2009.
l.C. 73-101, provides that, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared."
In Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965 Idaho (1914) the Idaho Supreme Court

explained the meaning of those words, "unless expressly so declared":
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[S]ection 3, Rev. Codes ... provides that "no part of these Revised Codes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." We do not think, however, that this
section means that the statute must use the words, "This statute is to be deemed
retroactive." We think it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the
intention to make the law retroactive is clear. In other words, if the language
clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the intent to make the law
retroactive is expressly declared within the meaning of section 3, Rev. Codes.
143 P, at 968 (emphasis added).

By providing that the statute applies to herd districts created before or after July 1, 2009,
(i.e., by use of the words "has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be") the legislature has
evidenced a clear intent that the statute is to be applied retroactively to all herd districts,
whenever created.
The fact that the legislature changed the law after Judge Petrie declared the herd district
invalid does not change the outcome. No less than the United States Supreme Court has so held.
In the case of Chase Securities Corp. vs. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S. Ct. 1137 (1945)
Donaldson sued Chase Securities (Chase) for violating Minnesota's Blue Sky laws. Chase
pleaded a statute of limitations defense. The trial court rejected the statue of limitations defense,
and awarded Donaldson damages. Chase appealed. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and
held that the statute of limitations did bar Donaldson's claim. The case was remanded to the trial
court for proceedings related to final disposition.
While proceedings were pending in the lower court, the Minnesota legislature amended
the Blue Sky laws, and allowed suits such as Donaldson's to be brought within one year of
passage of the amendment to the Blue Sky laws. Based upon the legislative amendment to the
statute, the trial court then ruled that the amended law applied, and that Donaldson's claim was
now valid.
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Chase appealed again, and the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the newly amended
statute "was applicable and had the effect of lifting any pre-existing bar of the general limitation
statute and that in so doing it did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Chase vs. Donaldson, 325 U.S., at 308-309.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Chase had not been deprived of due
process by the state legislature's legislative "fix" of Donaldson's cause of action, and Donaldson
was allowed to recover, notwithstanding the prior entry of judgment against Donaldson by the
Minnesota Supreme Court before the legislative amendment that revived Donaldson's claim.
Similarly, notwithstanding Judge Petrie's January 21, 2009 order declaring the 1982
herd district invalid, the July 2009 amendment to LC. 31-857, which by its express language is to
be retroactively applied, invalidates Judge Petrie's January 2009 ruling. Pursuant to LC. 31-857,
because it has been more than seven years since the 1982 herd district was created, Piercy may
not challenge the proceedings or jurisdictional steps taken by the Canyon County Commissioners
in 1982 when they passed the herd district ordinance at issue. Piercy's bull was therefore
pastured in a herd district, the collision occurred in a herd district, and all of Piercy' s defenses
relating to the validity of the 1982 herd district, including Piercy' s Eighth Defense in his Answer
to Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (which defense alleges Piercy is entitled to 'open range'
immunity) must be dismissed.
This Court should therefore rule, based upon the legislative amendment alone, that the
1982 herd district is valid, and that Piercy is subject to liability under Idaho's herd district
statutes.
Judge Ford accepted this reasoning, and held that "this court finds that the Idaho
legislature expressed, and a literal reading of the plain language of the statute confirms, the intent
7

that the 2009 amendment creating a seven year statute of limitations was to be applied
retroactively to existing enumerated districts. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the stated
purpose of eliminating 'unreasonable delayed' legal challenges to the districts." R. Vol. 8,
p.1410.
In reaching the above conclusion, Judge Ford considered the legislative history of the
2009 amendment to LC. 31-857. R. Vol.8, p.1408-1411. House Bill No. 102 stated that this was
"an act relating to counties amending section 31-857, Idaho Code, to provide that challenges to
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding orders relating to the creation, establishment ...
of certain districts shall not be heard or considered following the lapse of a specified period of
time." (emphasis supplied) Id. at p. 1408-1409.
Judge Ford also considered the minutes for the House Judiciary, Rules and
Administrative Committee held on February 11, 2009. The minutes indicate that the bill sponsor
Representative Lake was asked to explain the proposed legislation and said:
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitation for procedural
and jurisdictional districts under Idaho law. This will eliminate unreasonably

delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the County
Commissioner after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and
have been relied upon by the citizens and the county. (emphasis supplied)
Id. at p.1409
Judge Ford also considered a minute for the House Local Government Committee held
on February 18, 2009 in which Representative Lake presented House Bill 102 and the minutes
stated the following:
He stated that this began in Judiciary and Rules because of Jefferson County
court case alleging that a herd district had not been created appropriately. HO
102 (sic) establishes that if a district is created, established, disestablished,
dissolved or modified, challenges shall not be heard or considered following
the lapse of a certain time period. (emphasis supplied) Id. at p. 1409
8

Judge Ford considered a minute from the Senate Local Government and Taxation
Committee in which the following was stated:
... In cases involving a herd district, the validity of the district has been

questioned due to the historical circumstances of the determination. This bill
clarifies the issue of whether a district is established or disestablished and that
the duty of proof falls on anyone but the county. If the county has acted and
gone through the process of establishing a district, it is a matter of law.
(emphasis supplied) Id. at p. 1410
Finally, Judge Ford looked at the Statement of Purpose for the 2009 amendment which
stated:
This bill establishes a standard seven year statute of limitations for
procedural and jurisdictional challenges to the creation of governmental districts
under Idaho law. This will eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges
to the procedures used by the County Commission after seven years have
passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by the citizens
of the county. (emphasis supplied) Id. at p. 1410
Accordingly Judge Ford correctly reversed Judge Petrie's prior ruling invalidating the
1982 Canyon County herd district by finding that the 2009 amendment created a seven year
statute of limitations which was to be applied retroactively to existing herd districts and that to
hold otherwise would eviscerate the stated purpose of eliminating "unreasonably delayed legal
challenges" totheherddistrict. /d.atp.1410-1411.

C.

The Statute of Limitations Set Forth at Idaho Code § 5-224 Prevents Piercy From

Contesting the Validity of the 1982 Herd District.
In the event that this Court finds LC. § 31-857 statute of limitations is not retroactive,

Guzman maintains in the alternative that the statute of limitations set forth by LC. § 5-224 bars
Piercy from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district.
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Idaho Code§ 5-224 provides that, "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for
must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Idaho Code§ 10-1201 et seq. both refer to the process of
obtaining declaratory relief as an "action." Idaho Code§ 5-240 defines an "action" as a special
proceeding of a civil nature. Idaho Code§ 5-201 provides that "[c]ivil actions can only be
commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have
accrued, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute."
The Idaho Supreme Court has treated cases before it involving declaratory actions as
"civil actions." See Smith v State Board of Medicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191, 194, 259 P.2d
1033, 1034 (1953) ("this is a civil action, albeit for a declaratory judgment."); Freiburger v. JU-B Engineers, Inc., 141Idaho415, 423-24, 111P.3d100, 108-109)(2005)(award of attorney

fees in declaratory judgment action pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) which allows for the
recovery of attorney fees in "any civil action.").
Based on the above precedent,, Judge Ford held that " if it is determined upon appellate
review that the statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code § 31-857 does not apply to the facts
of this case, this court concludes that as a civil action, declaratory actions fall within the "catch
all" statute oflimitations provision ofl.C. §5-224." R. Vol. 8 at p.1412.
Assuming LC. §5-224 applies to Piercy's declaratory relief action, the court must also
determine when the declaratory cause of action accrued. Under LC. §5-224, an action "must be
commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued." Based on
Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21Idaho77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911), the cause of action

accrued the date the herd district went into effect.
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In Canaday, the Idaho Supreme Court granted a "nonsuit" at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case at trial stating:
It is next contended that appellant's cause of action, if she had one, was barred
by the statute of limitations (subd. 1 of section 4054 and sections 4037, 4038,
and 4060, Rev. Codes). We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is
barred by the statute of limitations; and that this action should have been
brought at least within five years from the date such cause of action arose. We
think it sufficiently appears that the appellant sat by when Ordinances Nos. 71
and 75 were passed in 1900, and more than nine years before this action was
commenced, and made no complaint of any damages having been sustained to
her property by reason of said ordinances and the vacation of the streets. And,
again, in 1905, when Ordinance No. 115 was passed, she made no protest or
objection of any kind. She knew that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company was
expending a great deal of money in establishing its lumber plant upon said
blocks and a portion of one of the streets, and made no protest of any kind
whatever to the city and made no claim for damages to her property as resulting
from the passage of said ordinances. The first time she complained of damage
to her property, so far as the record shows, was when she commenced this
action, June 15, 1909.

Id at 835.
Using Canaday as guidepost, Judge Ford made the following findings and applied them
to the case at hand to reach the conclusion Piercy was alternatively time barred from filing the
declaratory action challenging the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd district by Idaho
Code§ 5-224:
Piercy has denied specific knowledge of the status of the 1982 Canyon County
herd district ordinance prior to the accident that spawned this lawsuit. He has
acknowledged farming in Canyon County for essentially his entire life,
including the time period during which the 1982 Canyon County herd district
ordinance was enacted by the Canyon County Board of Commissioners. He
also admits involvement with local cattle ranching associations and other cattle
ranchers residing in Canyon County prior to and since 1982. Paul Axness'
testimony suggests that Piercy has had to consider herd district versus open
range concerns prior to the accident in this case. While the testimony of Paul
Axness was insufficient to meet the required elements of estoppel claims, it still
suggests that Piercy should have and may have considered whether his property
was subject to herd district restrictions prior to the accident that is the basis of
this action. Piercy has argued that he was unaware of the 1982 Canyon County
herd district ordinance because of the deficiency in notice provided by the
11

Board of Commissioners at the time the 1982 herd district was created. There
was actual public notice given of the Board of Commissioners' intent to
consider and possibly adopt the ordinance. Following the enactment of this
ordinance in 1982, Canyon County's public institutions recognized and
disseminated information indicating that lands located in Canyon County were
subject to the purported herd district. This status would have also been
confirmed by the relevant public records regarding this challenged ordinance.
This court finds that there was sufficient evidence that Piercy should have been
aware of the enactment of the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance at
the time of its enactment that this declaratory action accrued and the four year
statute of limitations established by LC. § 5-224 commenced to run on the date
the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance was adopted by the Canyon
County Board of Commissioners. This statute of limitations would have run in
1986. Therefore, Piercy was alternatively time barred from filing the
declaratory action challenging the validity of the 1982 Canyon County herd
district by Idaho Code§ 5-224." Id. at p.1413-1414
Aside from sustaining Judge Ford based on his correct legal reasoning, there should be
strong support for the policy of finality. This herd district ordinance had been in place for more
than 25 years at the time Piercy tried to overturn it. During that time records disappeared,
memories lapsed and witnesses died. During that time, the motoring public relied on the fact that
their safe passage on the roadways of Canyon County was being ensured by a presumptive herd
district law. During that time ranchers have believed that their crops were safeguarded by an
ordinance that required their neighbors to fence-in their livestock. There can be no good served
by allowing a litigant who has lived under the benefits of a herd district ordinance for more than
25 years to challenge that law when it becomes convenient for him. For the sake of good
government the right to challenge a law relied upon by the public must be limited. Piercy had
four years to make his challenge. Judge Ford's determination is correct and should be sustained.

D.
Guzman and Sutton Were Entitled to Defend Canyon County's Herd District
Ordinance.
Piercy argues that Guzman and Sutton lack standing to assert statute of limitations
defenses because Canyon County waived such a defense by failing to specifically assert it in his
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pleadings. Piercy's position ignores Idaho Code 10-1202 which gives Guzman the right to argue
that the 1982 herd district was valid:
10-1202. PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY HAVE
DECLARATION. Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or
other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder. (emphasis supplied)
Guzman's "rights, status or other legal relations" are obviously "affected" by the
existence or non-existence of the 1982 herd district. If the herd district is valid, then Guzman
has the right to seek liability and damages from Piercy. As Judge Ford found: "Sutton and
Guzman have an articulated and identifiable financial interest in the outcome of the declaratory
action and so this court will consider their statutes of limitations defense." R. Vol.8, p.1405. It
is not an exaggeration to say that the validity of the outcome of Guzman's lawsuit against Piercy
depends on the validity of the herd district law itself and Guzman should be entitled to show that
the herd district is valid.
Furthermore, it defies common sense that a governmental agency is an indispensable
party every time the validity of a law is in question. For example, that would mean that every
time a federal law is contested, it would become necessary to join the federal government as a
party. The waste of time and energy if such were in fact the law is apparent.
E.

The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code §31-859 is Constitutional.
1. Statutory Construction.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Stuart v State, 149 Idaho 35, 40; 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (additional citations omitted).
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The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the
statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Doe Iv Doe,
138 Idaho 893, 903, 71P.3d1040, 1050 (2003) (additional citations omitted). Every reasonable
presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. State v Pontier, 95
Idaho 707, 711, 518 P.2nd 969, 973 (1974) (additional citations omitted). The legislature is
presumed to have acted within its constitutional power. Worthen v State, 96 Idaho 175, 179, 525
P.2d 957, 961 (1974) (additional citations omitted).
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must show the statute is
unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of

Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (additional citations omitted). A
facial challenge requires a showing that the statute in question is unconstitutional in all
applications and is purely a question of law. Id. (additional citations omitted). By contrast, an
"as applied" challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the
offending conduct. Id. (Additional citations omitted). It appears Piercy is solely making an "as
applied" challenge.
2. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 Does Not Violate Procedural Due
Process.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends
the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and

Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 18-19 (1998) (additional
citations omitted). Furthermore, "due process is not a concept rigidly applied to every
adversarial confrontation, but instead is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections
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as are warranted by the particular situation." Id. at 226, 970 P.2d at 19. (Additional citations
omitted).
For purposes of determining whether an individual's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. Id. It
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Additional citations omitted).
Only after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis,
in which it determines what process is due. Id. (Additional citations omitted).
Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the
particular statute or ordinance in question. Id. (Additional citations omitted). A person must
have more than an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to have a property interest
therein. Id. at 227, 970 P.2d at 20. (Additional citations omitted). Further, that person must
have more than a unilateral expectation in the benefit; instead, she must have a "legitimate claim
of entitlement to it." Id. (Additional citations omitted).
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 226, 970 P.2d
at 19, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
Examples of potentially protected property interests include drivers' licenses, welfare
benefits, unemployment insurance, homestead exemptions, Social Security, workers'
compensation and medical licenses. See, Ides, Allan and Christopher N. May, Examples &
Explanations: Constitutional Law - Individual Rights, 2nd Ed., Aspen Law & Business, 2001.
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Piercy has failed to support his argument that open range status is a clearly protected
property interest. Furthermore, Title 25, Chapter 24, Idaho Code demonstrates there is no such
constitutional right because it grants counties the right to create herd districts. Idaho Code §252401. The statutes simply do not entitle Piercy to certain benefits, nor do they create an
expectation that property is open range. Piercy has no legitimate claim of entitlement to open
range property status. Consequently, he does not have a property interest protected by the
constitution.
Even assuming Piercy does have a protected property interest, Piercy has failed to show
the statutes providing notice and an opportunity to be heard violate due process. Rather, Piercy
asserts the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 somehow violates the statutory provision
regarding notice and an opportunity to be heard. This argument is flawed.
It is well established that the Due process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
prohibit a state from attaching reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal
constitutional rights. Martinez v State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 131 (Ct.App.1997)
(Additional citations omitted). The test is whether the defendant has had "a reasonable
opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined." Id. (Additional
citations omitted). The current statute of limitations for a challenge to the validity of an
ordinance is four (4) years pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-224. The 2009 Amendment expanded the
statute of limitations to seven (7) years. Even applied retroactively, four or seven years is more
than a reasonable amount of time in which to pursue a claim for relief. See, Martinez, 130 Idaho
at 535, 944 P.2d at 132 (reaffirming that a one year statute of limitations is a reasonable amount
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of time within which to file an application for post-conviction relief.) Therefore, there is no
merit to Piercy' s argument that procedural due process was violated.
Judge Ford agreed with the above reasoning and found that the 2009 amendment to LC.
31-857 did not violate Piercy' s rights to procedural due process. The Judge ruled that Piercy did
not have a protected property interest in preserving or maintaining open range status on his
property, since the Idaho Code clearly allows the regulation of such matters in its statutory
provisions authorizing counties to create herd districts. R. Vol. 8, p.1415. Judge Ford further
found, that even assuming Piercy had a protected property interest in preserving his open range
status, his argument that his right to notice and to be heard does not survive careful scrutiny.
Since the 1982 Canyon County herd district ordinance was adopted 29 years before the Motion
for Reconsideration in 2011, Judge Ford found that Piercy had fully had an opportunity to
challenge the ordinance. R. Vol. 8, p.1416.
3. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 Does Not Violate Substantive Due
Process.
The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against state deprivation of a person's

"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n., Inc. v Gooding
County, 148 Idaho 653; 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010), citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1; Idaho
Const. Art 1, § 13. In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action that
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational
basis. Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n. Inc., 148 Idaho at _ _, 227 P.3d at 915, citing Pace v. Hymas,
111 Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Conversely, a substantive due process violation
will not be found if the state action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative
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objective." Id., citing McNeely v State, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 (Ct.App.1990
(citing State v Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App.1984)).
Piercy's claim that the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-857 violates substantive due
process is without merit. First, as argued above, there is no evidence or case law supporting
Piercy' s claim that he has a constitutionally protected property interest. Second, even if the
Court finds Piercy has a property interest, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 bears a
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.
The 2009 amendment precludes a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps
preceding certain orders of the board of county commissioners after seven (7) years from the
date of the order. The purpose of the amendment, as discussed in greater detail above, is to
protect existing school, road, herd, or other districts from stale claims. Similar to the facts of this
case, many of these districts have been in existence for decades. A challenge to the creation of
such districts would require review of evidence that because of the passage of time no longer
exists due to destruction or death, and/or reliance on faded memories. Therefore, the amendment
is valid because the government has sufficient reason to want to avoid stale claims. Furthermore,
the expressed legislative purpose of the 2009 amendment is to "eliminate unreasonably delayed
legal challenges to the procedures sued by the County Commission after seven years have
passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by the citizen and the county."
Statement of Purpose, supra, R. Vol. 8, p.1410. Such purpose clearly bears a reasonable
relationship to a permissible legislative objective.

18

Finally, it is well-established the legislature may establish statutes of limitations. Stuart v

State, 149 Idaho 35; 232 P.3d 813, 820 (2010). Because such authority is vested with the
legislature, there cannot be a substantive due process violation.
Judge Ford found that found the statute did not deprive Piercy of life, liberty, or a
protected property interest, as discussed above. R. Vol. 8, p.1416. The Judge also found that
seven year statute of limitations was rationally related to the State of Idaho's stated goal of
reducing the number of stale, unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures utilized to
create herd districts. Judge Ford reasoned that such stale challenges present difficulties for
obtaining and reviewing important evidence that may no longer exist due to the loss or
destruction of records and the death, unavailability or faded memories of important witnesses.
Likewise the Judge reasoned there is no rational basis in confirming the legitimacy of such
entities that citizens have relied upon for years, and if disputed, to encourage timely challenges
to the entities existence. R. Vol. 8, p.1416-1417
For all these reasons, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code §31-859 is constitutional.

F. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying the Cross-Appellants' Motion to
Reconsider and Reverse the Court's Order Denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions in
Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved, Entered On Or About October 9,
2007, Based on Estoppel by Laches, Quasi-Estoppel, and Equitable Estoppel.
Guzman joins in and adopts Sutton's arguments that the equitable doctrine of equitable
estoppel by laches, quasi-estoppel, and equitable estoppel prevents Piercy from contesting the
validity of the 1982 herd district. Guzman is mindful of the ever-expanding size of the Court's
file in this case, and the Court's limited time and resources. Guzman's failure to fully brief these
issues is not a reflection of the merits of these arguments as they apply to this case; rather, it is
simply a recognition that Sutton's counsel is more capable of briefing and presenting these
19

arguments to this Court, and the Court does not need to expend the additional time and resources
to read Guzman's counsel's arguments on the issue. Undersigned's arguments on this issue
mirror Sutton's counsel's arguments.

V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Guzman has shown that Judge Ford's rulings were correct and should be sustained
on appeal.

, ' ftc

Respectfully submitted thisc:9U day of March, 2013.
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